## Perceptions of Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland: Findings from the Young Life \& Times Survey 2017 to 2020

May 2022


Department of
Justice
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## Executive Summary

## Context

The Young Life \& Times Survey (YLT) records the views of a representative sample of 16-year olds in Northern Ireland on a range of issues, such as community relations, health, politics, sectarianism and education. Following on from results of the 2017 survey, further questions were commissioned in 2018, 2019 and 2020 to provide ongoing insight into peoples' perceptions of paramilitary influence and activity in Northern Ireland.

## Area

Figures remained consistent across the first three years, with around one third of respondents identifying their area as mixed $(32.6 \%, 33.1 \%$, $33.5 \%)$. However, in 2020 this decreased to $25.2 \%$. Furthermore, a similar percentage identified their area as neither Loyalist nor Republican in 2017 (32.4\%) and 2018 ( $31.6 \%$ ). However more respondents described their area as mainly Loyalist in 2019 (29.9\%) and 2020 (32.3\%).
The majority of respondents (91.8\%, 92.2\%, 89.9\%, $87.9 \%$ ) felt very or fairly safe living within their area.

## Levels of Crime

Across all four years, over half of respondents, ( $62.9 \%, 58.4 \%, 54.6 \%$, $58.7 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that there were low levels of crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour within their area. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement increased over the first three years ( $22.1 \%, 28.6 \%, 30.5 \%$ ). However, this proportion decreased in 2020 (24.4\%). More males, respondents who identified as Protestant or respondents who identified their area as neither Loyalist nor Republican strongly agreed or agreed with this statements.

## Crime and Safety

In 2017, 54.8\% of respondents felt people within their area were confident reporting crime and antisocial behaviour to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). This decreased to below half of respondents from 2018 to 2020 ( $47.8 \%, 48.2 \%, 42.9 \%$ ). Around half (55.2\%, 50.2\%, 50.0\%) strongly agreed or agreed that PSNI keeps their area safe from 2017 to 2019. In 2020 this decreased to $37.9 \%$.

## Sense of Community

Across all four years, around half of respondents ( $53.9 \%, 48.2 \%, 54.2 \%$, $56.8 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that there is a strong sense of community within their area and around three quarters ( $78.8 \%$, $78.3 \%, 78.8 \%, 76.6 \%$ ) felt they had some sense of belonging to their neighbourhood. However, around almost nine out of ten did not feel they had any influence upon local decisions made about their area (88.9\%, 88.3\%, $90.5 \%, 88.1 \%)$.

## Paramilitary Influence

Across all four years, a small proportion of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that paramilitary groups 'create fear and intimidation' within their area ( $13.8 \%$, $18.5 \%, 20.4 \%, 14.1 \%$ ), have a controlling influence ( $12.6 \%$, $16.4 \%, 14.7 \%, 12.8 \%$ ), or help keep their area safe $(7.3 \%, 6.1 \%$, $5.8 \%, 6.2 \%)$. A slightly higher proportion of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime, drugdealing and anti-social behaviour within their area ( $18.5 \%, 24.3 \%$, $24.4 \%$, 17.0\%).

## The Law and Justice System

The proportion of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed that people within their area
 generally abide by the law (72.6\%, $70.4 \%, 67.2 \%, 65.9 \%)$ decreased each year. However, a smaller proportion of respondents felt that they were protected by the law and justice system ( $65.6 \%$, 53.3\%, 57.9\%, 50.1 \%).

## Young People and Crime

Across all four years, around half of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that there is a lot of crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour among young people within their area $(57.3 \%, 50.1 \%, 47.7 \%$, 53.9\%). However, a higher proportion of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that young people are influenced too much by paramilitary groups within their area ( $72.3 \%, 64.8 \%, 66.0 \%, 59.5 \%$ ).
More respondents who identified their area as neither Loyalist nor Republican disagreed or strongly disagreed with both statements.


### 1.1 Background

The Executive action plan for tackling paramilitary activity, criminality and organised crime was published in July 2016. The action plan is a series of 38 commitments on the part of the Executive, aimed at addressing paramilitary activity, and has four long-term outcomes:

- Paramilitarism has no place in society;
- Safe and confident communities;
- Increased confidence in the justice system; and
- Support is available for those who wish to transition.

The Tackling Paramilitarism Programme Board was set up to oversee progress in the delivery of the action plan. The Board agreed a set of indicators to assess progress in the achievement of the four outcomes; these indicators cover prevalence, community coercion and community capacity. The Board also wanted to ensure public perceptions were included within its progress measures. As there was no existing survey measure, new questions were commissioned as part of the 2017 Young Life and Times Survey (YLTS) to provide baseline data on the public's perceptions of and attitudes towards paramilitary influence and activity in Northern Ireland. These survey questions have been repeated over the following years to monitor any changes in attitudes and perceptions as work on the delivery of the action plan progresses. This publication presents key findings from the survey and compares year-on-year responses. This will be updated as additional information becomes available. The current version highlights trends and findings over a four year period, from 2017 to 2020.

### 1.2 The Young Life and Times Survey

The Young Life and Times (YLT) survey is a constituent part of ARK (Access Research Knowledge), a resource providing access to social and political information for Northern Ireland (ARK Website (Opens in new window)). The aim of YLT is to record the views of 16 -year olds on a range of social issues such as community relations, health, politics, sectarianism and education in Northern Ireland.

The YLT was launched in 1998 by Queen's University Belfast (Opens in new window) and Ulster University (Opens in new window) and runs annually. The survey is designed to provide a snapshot of the behaviour, lifestyle and views of a representative sample of young people in Northern Ireland. Further information on sample selection can be found in the Technical Annex section.

The survey comprises of two distinct parts, (i) core questions about the respondents and their individual circumstances, and (ii) a variety of mainly attitudinal questions commissioned by clients. This allows, where appropriate, for responses to be broken down by key demographic characteristics. Due to the high level of interest in the YLT survey in 2017 and the respective number of questions included, a split survey needed to be run (see Technical Information for further details).

The survey receives ethnical approval from the School Ethics Committee of the School of Social Sciences, Education and Social Work (Opens in new window), Queen's University Belfast.

## Findings

## About this Chapter

The following section provides key findings from the Department of Justice's 'Perceptions of Paramilitarism' section of the Young Life and Times Survey (YLT). Respondents were asked a series of questions about the area in which they lived, including feelings of a sense of community, feelings of safety, the influence of paramilitaries and youth crime. Information in relation to the overall responses to each question is provided within the text. In addition, responses to questions have been broken down by key demographic variables including gender, religion, urban/rural status and political identity. All demographic information is based on information provided by respondents and so area and personal categories are therefore self-reported. Note that for presentation some percentages have been rounded in both tables and text. Please refer to the technical annex (Annex 1) for guidance. Where tables are referenced, this refers to the accompanying Excel file.

### 2.1 Area

## Religious Identity within their Area

Respondents were asked to describe the religious identity associated with their area. Figures remained consistent across the first three years, with around one third of respondents identifying their area as mixed. A similar proportion of respondents identified their area as mainly Protestant from 2017 to 2019, while a lower percentage of respondents identified their area as mainly Catholic over the same time period (Figure 1).

In 2020, 25.2\% identified their area as mixed, a decrease from 33.5\% in 2019. Furthermore, 32.5\% identified their area as mainly Protestant, a decrease from $33.3 \%$ the previous year, whereas $31.9 \%$ identified their area as mainly Catholic, up from 26.6\% in 2019 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Religious identity within their area


## Findings

## Political Identity within their Area

Respondents were also asked to describe the political identity of their area. Almost a third ( $32.4 \%, 31.6 \%, 28.6 \%$ ) of respondents stated that their area was neither Loyalist nor Republican across the first three years, however this figure decreased slightly each year, before dropping to around one fifth of respondents in 2020 ( $20.6 \%$ ). Under one third felt their area was mainly Loyalist ( $29.4 \%$, $29.0 \%, 29.9 \%, 32.3 \%$ ) across all four years, however figures show an upward trend from 2018 to 2020 . While figures for those who identified their area as mainly Republican remained consistent at around one fifth across all four years $(20.8 \%, 22.4 \%, 22.9 \%$, $22.4 \%$ ). Less than one fifth of respondents couldn't choose across the first three years ( $17.4 \%, 17.1 \%, 18.5 \%$ ), however in 2020 this figure rose to almost one quarter (24.7\%) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Political Identity within their area


## 2 <br> Findings

## Safety within their Area

Respondents were subsequently asked how safe they felt living in their area. Across all four years, around nine tenths of respondents felt very or fairly safe living within their area $(91.8 \%, 92.2 \%, 89.9 \%, 87.9 \%)$. However, from 2018 the proportion of respondents who felt very safe or fairly safe showed a downward trend. Contrastingly, the percentage of respondents that felt neither safe nor unsafe steadily increased from $2018(5.4 \%, 6.6 \%, 8.9 \%)$. Across all four years, figures were consistently low for those who felt fairly or very unsafe within their area $(2.3 \%, 2.4 \%, 3.5 \%, 3.2 \%)$ (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Safety within their area


## 2 <br> Findings

## Gender and Safety within their Area

Across all four years, a larger proportion of males felt very or fairly safe living in their area, compared to females. The proportion of male respondents who felt very or fairly safe showed a downward trend from 2018 to 2020. Furthermore, the percentage of female respondents who felt very or fairly safe decreased year on year (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Feeling of safety within area by gender


School Attended and Safety within their Area
Across all four years, a larger proportion of respondents who attended a secondary school ( $84.2 \%, 81.5 \%, 85.2 \%, 78.3 \%$ ) felt very or fairly safe living in their area, compared to those who attended a grammar school ( $76.5 \%, 77.1 \%, 76.6 \%$, 76.0\%) (Table 3a; 3b; 3c; 3d).

Religion and Safety within their Area
Across all four years, a lower proportion of respondents who felt very or fairly safe living in their area identified as having no religion compared to those who identified as Catholic or Protestant. After peaking at $87.2 \%$ in 2018 , this figure decreased each year, to $82.3 \%$ in 2020 . Those who identified as Catholic and felt very or fairly safe showed a slight downward trend, each year, from $95.9 \%$ in 2017 to $92.6 \%$ in 2020. For those who identified as Protestant, figures were higher in both 2017 and 2018 ( $97.0 \%, 96.6 \%$ ) before dropping below the figures for those identifying as Catholic in 2019 and 2020 ( $91.4 \%, 91.7 \%$ ) (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Feeling of safety within area by religion


## 2 <br> Findings

Area Type and Safety within their Area
More respondents in 2017, 2019 and 2020 who lived in rural areas felt very or fairly safe ( $97.2 \%, 91.8,94.1 \%$ ), compared to those in urban areas ( $88.5 \%, 89.1 \%, 85.1 \%$ ). In 2018, the proportion of respondents in urban areas who felt very safe or fairly safe peaked at $96.1 \%$ before decreasing the following two years. Contrastingly, the figures for those in rural areas was lowest in 2018 at $90.4 \%$, before increasing over the following two years (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Feeling of safety within area by area identity


Living Arrangements and Safety within their Area
Across all four years, more respondents who lived with both parents ( $93.1 \%, 94.7 \%, 91.3 \%, 91.0 \%$ ) felt very or fairly safe compared to those who lived with one parent ( $86.8 \%, 83.8 \%, 84.9 \%, 79.3 \%$ ) (Table 3a; 3b; 3c; 3d).

Area Identity and Safety within their Area
Across all four years, a greater proportion of those living in areas they identified as mainly Loyalist stated that they felt very or fairly safe living in their area compared with those residing in mainly Republican or neither Loyalist nor Republican areas. In 2018 and 2019 a higher proportion of respondents living in areas they identified as mainly Republican stated that they felt very or fairly safe living in their area compared to those living in areas identified as neither Loyalist nor Republican (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Feeling of safety within area by area identity


## 2 <br> Findings

### 2.2 Sense of Community

## Sense of Community within their Area

Respondents were asked if they felt there was a strong sense of community within their area. Across all four years, around half (53.9\%, $48.2 \%, 54.2 \%, 56.8 \%$ ) of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they felt a strong sense of community in their area. The number of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with this statement showed an upward trend from 2018 to 2020 . However, the figures for those who neither agreed nor disagreed have decreased over the same time period. For those that disagreed or strongly disagreed, the 2020 figure of $18.3 \%$, is consistent with the $2017(19.1 \%)$ and $2019(18.4 \%)$ figures; however, 2018 shows a peak of $23.4 \%$ of respondents who either disagreed or strongly disagreed (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Sense of community within their area


## Findings

## Gender and Sense of Community

In 2017, the proportion of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed that there was a sense of community in their area was consistent across both males and females (54.1\%, 53.9\%). In 2018 , more females ( $49.2 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that there was a sense of community in their area compared to males ( $46.7 \%$ ). Across the following two years the proportion of males $(54.8 \%, 61.0 \%)$ who strongly agreed or agreed was higher than females ( $54.0 \%, 53.7 \%$ ) and increased each year, peaking in 2020 (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Sense of community in their area by gender


## School Attended and Sense of Community

## Religion and Sense of Community

A lower proportion of those who identified as no religion strongly agreed or agreed that they felt a sense of belonging to their community compared to those who identified as Catholic or Protestant. From 2017 to 2019, a higher proportion of respondents who identified as Catholic strongly agreed or agreed compared to those who identified as Protestant. However, in 2020 a higher proportion of those who identified as Protestant ( $61.7 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed, compared to those who identified as Catholic (63.8\%) (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Sense of community in their area by level of education


Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who attended secondary school ( $84.2 \%, 81.5 \%, 85.2 \%, 78.3 \%$ ), strongly agreed or agreed that there was a sense of community in their area, compared to those who attended a grammar school ( $76.5 \%$, $77.1 \%, 76.6 \%$, 76.0\%) (Table 4a; 4b; 4c; 4d).

## Findings

## Area Type and Sense of Community

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who live in rural areas strongly agreed or agreed, compared with those who live in urban areas. However, the proportion of respondents living in urban areas who strongly agreed or agreed showed an upward trend, year on year, from 2018 to 2020 (Figure 11).
Figure 11: Sense of community in their area by area type


Living Arrangements and Sense of Community
Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who live with both parents ( $54.5 \%, 50.4 \%, 56.8 \%, 58.6 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed, compared with those who live with one parent ( $51.7 \%, 41.6 \%, 45.7 \%, 53.4 \%$ ). However, the same trend can be seen across both categories, with a drop in figures between 2017 and 2018, before a steady increase across the following three years (Table 4a; 4b; 4c; 4d).

## Area Identity and Sense of Community

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who lived in areas identified as mainly Republican strongly agreed or agreed that there was a strong sense of community in their area compared with those living in areas identified as mainly Loyalist or neither Loyalist nor Republican. A lower proportion of respondents who lived in areas identified as neither Loyalist nor Republican strongly agreed or agreed that there was a strong sense of community in their area in 2018, 2019 and 2020 compared to the other two groups (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Sense of community in their area by area identity


## Findings

### 2.3 Sense of Belonging

## Sense of Belonging to their Neighbourhood

Respondents were asked to think about their immediate neighbourhood, the kind of place it is and the kind of people who live there, and state if they felt a sense of belonging here. Figures were consistent across all four years, with around one third of respondents reporting 'yes, definitely' $(34.1 \%, 30.8 \%, 32.4 \%, 29.9 \%)$ and just under half stating 'yes, probably' $(44.7 \%, 47.5 \%, 46.4 \%, 46.7 \%)$. Figures also remained consistent for respondents who reported 'probably not' ( $14.6 \%, 15.5 \%, 15.5 \%, 15.4 \%$ ) and 'definitely not' ( $6.6 \%, 6.1 \%, 5.7 \%, 8.1 \%$ ) (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Sense of belonging to neighbourhood


## Findings

## Religion and Sense of Belonging

Across all four years, a lower proportion of respondents who identified as having no religion answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' regarding a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood when compared to those identifying as Protestant or Catholic, while also showing a downward trend. The figures remained fairly consistent for the proportion of respondents who answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' to this statement and identified as Catholic or Protestant (Figure 14).
Figure 14: Sense of belonging in neighbourhood by religion


Gender and Sense of Belonging

## Living Arrangements and Sense of Belonging

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who live with both parents answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' regarding a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood, compared with those who live with one parent. The figures for those living with both parents who answered yes definitely or yes probably stayed fairly consistent across all four years, however figures fluctuated for those who lived with one parent, decreasing between 2017 and 2018, before increasing in 2019 and decreasing again the following year (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Sense of belonging in neighbourhood by living arrangements


Across all four years, the proportion of respondents who answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' regarding a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood remained consistent for both males ( $78.5 \%, 77.3 \%, 78.7 \%, 76.8 \%$ ) and females ( $79.0 \%, 78.8 \%, 78.8 \%, 76.4 \%$ ). However, there is a general downward trend in the figures for both males and females (Table 16a; 16b; 16c; 16d).

## Findings

## Area Type and Sense of Belonging

Across all four years, more respondents who lived in rural areas answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' regarding a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood, compared to those who lived in urban areas. The proportion of respondents living in rural areas who answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' remained fairly consistent across all four years. However, the percentage of respondents answering 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' living in urban areas declined from $77.9 \%$ in 2019 to $73.8 \%$ in 2020.
Figure 16: Sense of belonging in neighbourhood by area identity


## School Attended and Sense of Belonging

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who attended a secondary school answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' regarding a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood compared with those who attended a grammar school. Around three quarters of respondents who attended a grammar school answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' to this statement across all four years. The proportion of those who attended a secondary school answering 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' rose from 2018 ( $81.5 \%$ ) to 2019 ( $85.2 \%$ ), before decreasing to $78.3 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 17).
Figure 17: Sense of belonging in neighbourhood by school attended


## Disability and Sense of Belonging

Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who reported that they have no disability answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' regarding a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood ( $81.1 \%, 80.1 \%, 80.7 \%, 78.8 \%$ ) compared to those who reported they did have a disability $(79.0 \%, 78.8 \%, 78.8 \%, 76.4 \%)$. However, there is a general downward trend across both categories (Table 16a; 16b; 16c; 16d).

## 2 <br> Findings

### 2.4 Influence upon Local Decisions

## Influence upon Local Decisions

Respondents were asked if they felt they had any influence when it came to the local decisions made within their area. For those stating 'probably not' and 'definitely not', figures were fairly consistent across 2017,2018 and 2020 , with almost nine tenths $(88.9 \%, 88.3 \%$, $88.1 \%$ ). However 2019 shows a peak with $90.5 \%$ of respondents stating that they 'probably did not' and 'definitely did not' have influence upon local decisions. A similar pattern can be seen with those who answered 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' to this statement. Over one tenth of respondents in 2017,2018 and $2020(11.1 \%, 11.7 \%, 12.0 \%)$ felt that they 'yes, definitely' or 'yes, probably' had an influence upon local decisions, while a decrease in this figure can be seen in 2019 ( $9.5 \%$ ).

Figure 18: Influence upon local decisions


## 2 <br> Findings

## Gender and Influence on Local Decisions

Figures for both male and female respondents who stated that they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' feel they have any influence on local decisions remained consistent across all four years. However, a larger proportion of females stated that they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' feel they have any influence on local decisions, compared to males (Figure 19).
Figure 19: Influence upon local decisions by gender


## Area Identity and Influence on Local Decisions

From 2018, a larger proportion of those who identified as having no religion ( $92.2 \%, 92.8 \%, 93.6 \%$ ) stated that they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' feel they have any influence on local decisions, compared to those who identified as Catholic or Protestant. Furthermore, in 2020, the proportion of respondents who identified as either Catholic (84.1\%) or Protestant (85.4\%) and who stated that they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' feel they have any influence on local decisions were lower than the previous years (Figure 20).
Figure 20: Influence upon local decisions by area identity
Proportion of respondents who answered probably not/definitely not


## Living Arrangements and Influence on Local Decisions

In 2017 and 2019, a higher percentage of respondents who lived with both parents stated that they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' feel they have any influence on local decisions ( $89.1 \%$, $90.7 \%$ ). However, in 2018 and 2020, a higher proportion of respondents who lived with one parent stated that they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' feel they have any influence on local decisions ( $89.2 \%$, $88.3 \%$ ) (Table 17a; 17b; 17c; 17d).

## 2 <br> Findings

## School Attended and Influence on Local Decisions

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who attended a grammar school felt they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' have any influence on local decisions compared with those who attended a secondary school (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Influence upon local decisions by school attended


## Disability and Influence on Local Decisions

Across the first three years, a greater proportion of respondents who reported that they have a disability felt they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' have any influence on local decisions ( $90.2 \%, 90.2 \%, 92.8 \%$ ) compared with those who reported that they did not have a disability $(88.5 \%, 87.9 \%, 90.0 \%)$. However, in 2020 , the proportion of respondents who reported that they have a disability and felt they 'probably did not' or 'definitely did not' have any influence on local decisions ( $85.8 \%$ ) fell below the percentage of those who reported that they did not have a disability ( $88.5 \%$ ) (Table 17a; 17b; 17c; 17d).

## Findings

### 2.5 Confidence in Reporting Crime

## Confidence in Reporting Crime to PSNI

Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that people in their area felt confident reporting crime and anti-social behaviour to PSNI. The number of respondents who strongly agreed with this statement peaked in 2017 at $20.4 \%$. However, this proportion then declined to its lowest in 2020 ( $12.4 \%$ ). Furthermore, the figures for those who agreed decreased over the same time period, from $34.4 \%$ in 2017 to $30.5 \%$ in 2020 . The percentage of respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement increased each year ( $22.1 \%, 23.9 \%, 24.3 \%, 29.8 \%$ ). In $2017,15.6 \%$ of respondents disagreed, but this figure rose to $17.8 \%$ in 2020. A similar trend can be seen for those who strongly disagreed, rising from $7.5 \%$ in 2017 to $9.5 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 23).

Figure 23: People in my area feel confident reporting crime and anti-social behaviour to PSNI


## Findings

## Gender and Reporting Crime to PSNI

In 2017 a greater proportion of female respondents (57.0\%) strongly agreed or agreed that they were confident reporting crime to PSNI compared to males ( $51.7 \%$ ). Whereas in 2018, more male respondents ( $51.6 \%$ ), strongly agreed or agreed with this. In 2019, figures remained consistent for both males and females ( $48.1 \%, 48.2 \%$ respectively). However, in 2020, a higher proportion of males strongly agreed or agreed with this. Figures for males showed a gradual downward trend across all four years. However, for females, figures decreased sharply in 2018, from the peak in 2017. The figures then increased again in 2019, before another decrease in 2020 (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Confidence in reporting crime to PSNI by gender


## Area Type and Reporting Crime to PSNI

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who lived in rural areas strongly agreed or agreed that they felt confident reporting crime and anti-social behaviour to PSNI compared with those in urban areas. However, figures for both categories show a downward trend from 2017 to 2020 (Figure 25).

Figure 25: Confidence in reporting crime to PSNI by area †ype


Living Arrangements and Reporting Crime to PSNI
Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who live with both parents ( $57.7 \%, 51.2 \%, 50.1 \%, 45.0 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed, compared with those who live with one parent ( $46.3 \%, 36.3 \%, 41.1 \%, 36.9 \%$ ). A general downward trend can be seen across both categories (Table 5a; 5b; 5c; 5d).

## Findings

## Area Identity and Reporting Crime to PSNI

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents living in areas identified as neither Loyalist nor Republican strongly agreed or agreed that they were confident reporting crime to PSNI compared to those living in areas identified as mainly Loyalist or mainly Republican (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Confidence reporting crime to PSNI by area identity


## Religion and Reporting Crime to PSNI

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who identified as Protestant strongly agreed or agreed that they were confident in reporting crime to PSNI, compared with those who identified as Catholic, or as having no religion. There is a general downward trend across all three categories from 2017 to 2020 (Figure 27).
Figure 27: Confidence reporting crime to PSNI by religion


## School Attended and Reporting Crime to PSNI

Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who attended a grammar school ( $58.9 \%, 54.6 \%, 54.4 \%, 48.5 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed, compared with those who attended a secondary school ( $51.3 \%, 37.5 \%, 41.3 \%, 38.5 \%$ ). Figures for those who strongly agreed or agreed and who attended a grammar school show a general downward trend, while figures for those who attended a secondary school dropped in 2018 (37.5\%), before rising in 2019 ( $41.3 \%$ ). Figures then decreased again in 2020 (38.5\%) (Table 5a; 5b; 5c; 5d).

## 2 <br> Findings

### 2.6 PSNI and Safety

## PSNI keep their Area Safe

Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that PSNI keeps their area safe. The proportion of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with this statement showed a downward trend across all four years, decreasing from $55.2 \%$ in 2017 to $37.9 \%$ in 2020 . Around one third of respondents stated that they neither agreed nor disagreed in 2017 ( $30.2 \%$ ), 2018 ( $31.9 \%$ ) and 2019 ( $32.3 \%$ ). However in 2020, the proportion increased to $39.9 \%$. The percentage of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement showed a downward trend across all four years ( $14.6 \%, 17.9 \%, 17.8 \%, 22.1 \%$ ) (Figure 28).

Figure 28: The PSNI keeps their area safe


## 2 <br> Findings

## Gender and PSNI Keep Area Safe

Across all four years, the proportion of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe were fairly consistent for both male and females. Figures for each follow a similar downward trend and in 2020, both figures show a sharp decrease. However, the figures for male respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe were slightly higher than females across most years (Figure 29).

Figure 29: PSNI keep area safe by gender


## Religion and PSNI Keep Area Safe

A higher proportion of respondents who identified as Protestant agreed or strongly agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe in 2017, 2019 and 2020 compared to those identifying as Catholic or as having no religion. However, figures for those who agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, across all three categories, show a downward trend, with those identifying as Catholic, or has having no religion showing a larger decrease (Figure 30).

Figure 30: PSNI keep area safe by religion


## School Attended and PSNI Keep Area Safe

Across the first three years, a greater proportion of those who attended a grammar school strongly agreed or agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe $(59.3 \%, 58.5 \%, 55.1,43.9 \%$ ) compared those who attended a secondary school $(51.6 \%, 38.1 \%, 43.4 \%$, $33.6 \%$ ). Furthermore, a general downward trend can be seen for those who strongly agreed or agreed and attended a grammar or secondary school from 2017 to 2020 (Table 9a; 9b; 9c; 9d).

## Findings

## Area Type and PSNI Keep Area Safe

Across the first three years, a greater proportion of those living in urban areas strongly agreed or agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe compared those living in rural areas. However, in 2020, while the proportion of respondents that agreed or strongly agreed decreased for both categories from the previous year, the proportion of those living in urban areas who strongly agreed or agreed (37.4\%) dropped below the percentage of those living in rural areas who strongly agreed or agreed (39.2\%) (Figure 31).
Figure 31: PSNI keep area safe by area type


## Area Identity and PSNI Keep Area Safe

Across all four years, a smaller proportion of respondents who identified their area as mainly Republican strongly agreed or agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe compared with those from areas identified as mainly Loyalist, or neither Loyalist nor Republican. While the proportion of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed from areas identified as mainly Loyalist showed a steady decline each year, those from areas identified as neither Loyalist nor republican remained consistent around three fifths ( $58.3 \%, 57.1 \%, 58.8 \%$ ), between 2017 and 2019, before decreasing in 2020 ( $43.3 \%$ ) (Figure 32).
Figure 32: PSNI keep area safe by area identity


## Living Arrangements and PSNI Keep Area Safe

Across all four years, a higher percentage of respondents who lived with both parents stated that they strongly agreed or agreed that the PSNI keeps their area safe ( $55.8 \%, 52.6 \%, 52.8 \%, 40.0 \%$ ), compared to those who lived with one parent $(54.1 \%, 42.3 \%, 40.4 \%$, $34.8 \%$ ). However, both categories show a general downward trend across all four years (Table 9a; 9b; 9c; 9d).

## 2 <br> Findings

2.7 The Law and Justice System

People in Area Abide by the Law
Respondents were asked if people in their area generally abide by the law. Over three fifths of respondents strongly agreed or agreed from 2017 to $2020(72.6 \%, 70.4 \%, 67.2 \%, 65.9 \%)$, however this shows a downward trend across all four years. The proportion of respondents who reported that they neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement increased year on year, since $2018(15.2 \%)$ to $2020(20.0 \%)$. While just over one tenth of respondents stated that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement ( $10.9 \%, 14.4 \%, 15.7 \%, 14.2 \%$ ) (Figure 33).

Figure 33: People in this area generally abide by the law


## Findings

Gender and People in Area Abide by the Law
Across all four years, a greater proportion of male respondents strongly agreed or agreed that people in their area generally abide by the law, compared with female respondents. However, figures for male female respondents who strongly agreed or agreed show a downward trend from 2017 to 2020, whereas the figures for males follow the same trend until 2019, before increasing slightly in 2020 (Figure 34).
Figure 34: People in their area abide by the law by gender


School Attended and People in Area Abide by the Law Across all four years, a greater proportion of those who attended a grammar school ( $77.8 \%, 77.4 \%, 73.2 \%, 73.2 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that people in their area generally abide by the law, compared with those who attended a secondary school ( $66.2 \%, 60.2 \%, 60.2 \%, 59.0 \%)$. While figures showed a slight, overall downward trend for both categories, they remained fairly consistent across 2019 and 2020 (Table 6a; 6b; 6c; 6d).

Religion and People in Area Abide by the Law
Across all four years, a lower proportion of respondents who identified as having no religion strongly agreed or agreed that people in their area generally abide by the law, compared to those identifying as Protestant or Catholic. A greater percentage of respondents who identified as Protestant strongly agreed or agreed in 2017, 2019 and 2020. While this figure peaked in 2017 (77.3\%) before decreasing over the following two years, 2020 shows an increase ( $76.0 \%$ ) from 2019 ( $72.2 \%$ ). In 2018, a higher proportion of Catholics strongly agreed or agreed with this statement ( $74.6 \%$ ), however figures for 2019 ( $67.0 \%$ ) and 2020 ( $65.2 \%$ ) show a downward trend (Figure 35).
Figure 35: People in their area abide by the law by religion


## 2 <br> Findings

## Area Type and People in their Area Abide by the Law

Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents living in rural areas strongly agreed or agreed that people in their area abide by the law compared to those in urban areas. While the figures for those living in urban areas who strongly agreed or agreed showed a downward trend across all years, those living in rural areas decreased from 2017 (82.3\%) to 2019 (71.8\%), before rising again in 2020 ( $75.7 \%$ ) (Figure 36).
Figure 36: People in area abide by the law by area type


Living Arrangements and People in Area Abide by the Law Across all four years, a higher percentage of respondents who lived with both parents strongly agreed or agreed that people in their area abide by the law $(78.0 \%, 75.3 \%, 69.9 \%, 70.0 \%)$, compared to those who lived with one parent ( $56.1 \%, 55.5 \%$, $58.0 \%$, 55.0\%) (Table 6a; 6b; 6c; 6d).

Area Identity and People in Area Abide by the Law Across all four years, a larger proportion of respondents who identified their area as neither Loyalist nor Republican strongly agreed or agreed that PSNI kept their area safe compared with those from areas identified as mainly Loyalist, or mainly Republican. However, the proportion of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed from areas identified as neither Loyalist nor republican showed a steady decline each year. Therefore the 2020 figures for respondents who strongly agreed or agreed remained fairly consistent across all three categories (Figure 37).
Figure 37: People in area abide by the law by area identity


## 2 <br> Findings

Protected by the Law and Justice System
Respondents were asked if people in their area felt that they were protected by the law and justice system. Across all four years, over half of respondents stated that they strongly agreed or agreed $(65.6 \%, 53.3 \%, 57.9 \%, 50.1 \%)$, showing a downward trend. In 2017, $22.1 \%$ of respondents stated that they neither agreed nor disagreed, however this figure rose to $32.2 \%$ in 2018 , then dropped again to $28.3 \%$ in 2019 , before rising again in 2020 . The proportion of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed stayed fairly consistent across 2017 ( $12.3 \%$ ), 2018 ( $14.4 \%$ ), 2019 ( $13.8 \%$ ) before peaking at $16.6 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 38).
Figure 38: People in my area feel protected by the law and justice system


## Findings

Religion and Protected by the Law and Justice System In 2017, 2019 and 2020, a greater percentage of respondents who identified as Protestant strongly agreed or agreed that they felt protected by the law and justice system compared to those identifying as Catholic or no religion. However, the proportion of respondents who identified as Protestant and strongly agreed or agreed, decreased from $72.3 \%$ in 2017 to $54.0 \%$ in 2018 , before rising again across the following two years. Similarly, the proportion of Catholics who strongly agreed or agreed fell from between 2017 ( $63.9 \%$ ) and 2018 ( $51.0 \%$ ). However after a rise in 2019 (55.2\%), 2020 figures dropped to a low of $44.7 \%$. A similar downward trend can be seen for those who identified as no religion, dropping from $59.6 \%$ in 2017 to $46.3 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 39).
Figure 39: Protected by law and justice system by religion


Area Type and Protected by the Law and Justice System
In 2017, 2018 and 2020, more respondents who lived in rural areas strongly agreed or agreed that they felt protected by the law and justice system, compared to those living in urban areas. The proportion of respondents living in rural areas who strongly agreed or agreed showed a steady downward trend across all four years. However, the proportion of those in urban areas decreased from 2017 $(61.3 \%)$ to $2018(51.8 \%)$. Furthermore, after a rise in 2019 ( $57.5 \%$ ), the figure decreased again in 2020 (46.7\%) (Figure 40).
Figure 40: Protected by law and justice system by area type


School Attended and Protected by the Law and Justice System Across all four years, a greater proportion of those who attended a grammar school ( $70.6 \%, 60.5 \%, 63.7 \%, 58.8 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that people in their area generally abide by the law, compared with those who attended a secondary school $(63.4 \%$, $40.2 \%, 52.1 \%, 42.1 \%$ ) (Table 7a; 7b; 7c; 7d).

## Findings

Gender and Protected by Law and Justice System Across all four years, a greater number of male respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they felt protected by the law and justice system compared to female respondents. However, while the figures for male respondents who strongly agreed or agreed show a general downward trend from 2017 to 2020, the figures for female respondents tended to fluctuate. The proportion of female respondents who strongly agreed or agreed dropped in 2018 ( $47.7 \%$ ) from the previous year ( $63.5 \%$ ). However, 2019 saw a rise in this figure (57.2\%) before it dropped again in 2020 to a low of $45.7 \%$ (Figure 41).

Figure 41: Protected by law and justice system by gender


Area Identity and Protected by Law and Justice System Across all four years, a larger proportion of respondents who identified their area as neither Loyalist nor Republican strongly agreed or agreed they felt protected by the law and justice system compared with those from areas identified as mainly Loyalist, or mainly Republican. Figures for all three categories show a similar trend across all four years, with figures for respondents who strongly agreed or agreed peaking in 2017, before a decrease in 2018. In 2019, there was an increase in all three categories, however this declined again in 2020 (Figure 42).
Figure 42: Protected by law and justice system by area identity


## Living Arrangements and Protected by the Law and Justice System

Across all four years, a greater proportion of those who live with both parents ( $69.3 \%, 58.2 \%, 61.3 \%, 54.9 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that they felt protected by the law and justice system, compared with those who live with one parent $(54.0 \%, 40.9 \%, 45.2 \%$, $37.0 \%$ ). However both categories followed a similar trend, with figures peaking in 2017, before decreasing in 2018. In 2019, figures rose again, before decreasing (Table 7a; 7b; 7c;7d).

## 2 <br> Findings

### 2.8 Levels of Crime

Low Levels of Crime in their Area
Respondents were asked if they felt there were low levels of crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour in their area. The majority of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement each year ( $62.9 \%, 58.4 \%, 54.6 \%, 58.7 \%)$. Furthermore, under one fifth of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement across all four years ( $14.9 \%, 12.9 \%, 14.9 \%, 17.0 \%$ ). The proportion of respondents increased each year from 2017 ( $22.1 \%$ ) to 2019 ( $30.5 \%$ ). However, in 2020 this figure dropped to $24.4 \%$ Figure 43).

Figure 43: There are low levels of crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour in my area


## 2 <br> Findings

## Gender and Low Levels of Crime

Across all four years the figures for both male and female respondents who strongly agreed or agreed that there was low crime in their area followed a similar trend. Figures for both show a downward trend from 2017 to 2019, before they increased again in 2020. However, from 2018 to 2020, a greater proportion of male respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement compared with females (Figure 44).
Figure 44: Low levels of crime in area by gender


## Religion and Low Levels of Crime

Across all four years, a smaller proportion of respondents who identified as having no religion strongly agreed or agreed that there was low crime in their area. A greater proportion of respondents who identified as Protestant strongly agreed or agreed to this statement. Figures across all three categories followed the same trend, showing a steady decrease from 2017 to 2019, before rising again in 2020 (Figure 45).

Figure 45: Low levels of crime in area by religion


Living Arrangements and Low Levels of Crime
Across all four years, a greater proportion of those who live with both parents ( $67.4 \%, 63.1 \%, 56.6 \%, 64.1 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that there was low levels of crime in their area, compared with those who live with one parent $(48.3 \%, 43.1 \%, 47.7 \%, 43.5 \%)$. The figures for those who strongly agreed or agreed and lived with both parents showed a downward trend from 2017 to 2019, before increasing again in 2020. However, for those living with one parent, figures rose from 2018 to 2019 , before decreasing again in 2020 (Table 8a; 8b; 8c; 8d).

## Findings

## Area Type and Low Levels of Crime

Over the four years, a greater percentage of respondents who lived in rural areas strongly agreed or agreed that there was low levels of crime in their area, compared to those living in urban areas. The figures for those living in urban areas who strongly agreed or agreed stayed fairly consistent from 2018 to 2020. However, for those living in rural areas, figures tended to fluctuate, peaking in 2018 (73.6\%) before decreasing in 2019 (61.6\%) but rising again in 2020 ( $73.0 \%$ ). (Figure 46).
Figure 46: Low levels of crime in area by area type


## Area Identity and Low Levels of Crime

Across all four years, a smaller proportion of respondents who described their area as mainly Republican, strongly agreed or agreed there was low levels of crime in their area compared to those living in mainly Loyalist or neither Loyalist nor Republican areas. Across the time series, the greatest proportion of respondents who felt there were low levels of crime in their area lived in neither Loyalist nor Republican areas (Figure 47).
Figure 47: Low levels of crime in area by area identity


## School Attended and Low Levels of Crime

Across all four years, a greater proportion of those who attended a grammar school ( $64.9 \%, 63.9 \%, 58.7 \%, 65.8 \%$ ) strongly agreed or agreed that there was low levels of crime in their area, compared with those who attended a secondary school $(59.6 \%, 50.0 \%$, $48.3 \%, 52.3 \%$ ). Figures for both categories show a general downward trend from 2017 to 2019 , however both figures increased in 2020 (Table 8a; 8b; 8c; 8d).

## 2 <br> Findings

### 2.9 Paramilitary Influence

Survey respondents were asked four questions which specifically related to the influence of paramilitary groups.

## Paramilitary Groups have a Controlling Influence

The first question asked to what extent respondents agreed or disagreed that paramilitary groups have a controlling influence within their area. In 2017, $12.6 \%$ of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. In 2018 this figure increased to $16.4 \%$, before decreasing in 2019 ( $14.7 \%$ ) and 2020 ( $12.8 \%$ ). A higher proportion of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed to this statement in 2018 (20.5\%) and 2020 ( $22.3 \%$ ) than in 2017 ( $14.5 \%$ ) and 2019 ( $15.2 \%$ ). Almost three quarters ( $72.9 \%$ ) of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups have a controlling influence within their area in 2017 (Figure 48).

Figure 48: Paramilitary groups have a controlling influence within my area


## Findings

## Religion and Paramilitary Control

Across all four years, a lower proportion of respondents who identified has having no religion disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries have a controlling influence in their area, compared to those who identified as Protestant or Catholic. Across the first three years, a greater proportion of respondents who identified as Catholic disagreed or strongly disagreed to this statement, compared to Protestants. However in 2020, a higher proportion of those who identified as Protestants ( $70.5 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed compared to those who identified as Catholic (67.5\%) (Figure 49).
Figure 49: Paramilitaries have a controlling influence in area by religion


## Gender and Paramilitary Control

Across all four years, a higher proportion of males disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries have a controlling influence in their area, compared to females. However, a similar trend can be seen in figures for both male and female respondents, dropping from 2017 to 2018, before rising again in 2019. However, in 2020, the figures decreased again (Figure 50).

Figure 50: Paramilitaries have a controlling influence in area by gender


School Attended and Paramilitary Control
Across all four years, a higher proportion of those who attended a grammar school ( $76.6 \%, 69.1 \%, 78.4 \%, 73.9 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries have a controlling influence in their area, compared to those who attended a secondary school ( $68.1 \%, 54.5 \%, 59.3 \%, 54.9 \%$ ).

## 2 <br> Findings

## Living Arrangements and Paramilitary Control

Over the four years, a greater proportion of respondents who lived with both parents, disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries have a controlling influence in their area, compared to those living with one parent (Figure 51).
Figure 51: Paramilitaries have a controlling influence in area by living arrangements


## Area Identity and Paramilitary Control*

## Area Type and Paramilitary Control

Over all four years, those who lived in rural areas were more likely to disagree or strongly disagree that paramilitaries have a controlling influence in their area, compared to those living in urban areas. Around four fifths of those living in rural areas disagreed or strongly disagreed each year, except for a drop in 2018 ( $76.8 \%$ ). However, for those living in urban areas there was more fluctuation in figures, but a general overall downward trend can be seen (Figure 52).
Figure 52: Paramilitaries have a controlling influence in area by area type


In general, across the three years, a greater proportion of respondents who identified their area as neither Loyalist nor Republican, disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries have a controlling influence in their area, than those who identified their area as mainly Loyalist or mainly Republican. Furthermore, a higher percentage of respondents who identified their area as mainly Republican disagreed or strongly disagreed compared to those who identified their area as mainly Loyalist, across all three years (Table 10b; 10c; 10d).

## 2 <br> Findings

## Paramilitary Groups Help Keep their Area Safe

Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed that paramilitary groups helped keep their area safe. The number of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement rose from $2017(73.7 \%)$ to $2019(76.6 \%)$, before decreasing in 2020 ( $67.7 \%$ ). Over one quarter of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed across all four years $(25.2 \%, 30.4 \%, 27.9 \%$, $29.3 \%)$. However, the proportion of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with this statement declined from 2017 ( $7.3 \%$ ) to 2019 (5.8\%), before increasing again in 2020 (6.2\%) (Figure 53).

Figure 53: Paramilitary groups help keep this area safe


## 2 <br> Findings

Religion and Paramilitary Groups Help Keep Area Safe A greater percentage of respondents who identified as Protestant disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups keep their area safe in 2017 ( $74.7 \%$ ), 2018 ( $78.7 \%$ ) and 2020 ( $73.6 \%$ ). However, more respondents who identified as Catholic disagreed or strongly disagreed in 2019 (78.4\%). Furthermore, between 2019 and 2020, the figures for those disagreeing or strongly disagreeing, who identified as Catholic, or as having no religion showed a decrease, however for those identifying as Protestant, the figures stayed fairly consistent (Figure 54).
Figure 54: Paramilitaries keep area safe by religion


Gender and Paramilitary Groups Help Keep Area Safe In 2017, a higher proportion of male respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups keep their area safe ( $76.7 \%$ ), compared to females ( $71.4 \%$ ). However, in 2018 and 2019, figures for both male ( $75.1 \%, 77.0 \%$ ) and female respondents ( $75.0 \%, 76.4 \%$ ) remained consistent with each other. Furthermore, in 2020, the proportion of females who disagreed or strongly disagreed, decreased to $61.9 \%$ whereas the figures for males remained around three quarters ( $75.4 \%$ ) of respondents (Figure 55).
Figure 55: Paramilitaries keep area safe by gender


Living Arrangements and Paramilitary Groups Help Keep Area Safe
Across all four years, a greater proportion of respondents who lived with both parents ( $77.1 \%, 76.7 \%, 79.2 \%, 71.5 \%$ ), disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups help keep their area safe, compared to those who lived with one parent $(62.1 \%, 68.8 \%$, $66.0 \%, 56.0 \%$ ) (Table $11 \mathrm{a} ; 11 \mathrm{~b}$; $11 \mathrm{c} ; 11 \mathrm{~d}$ ).

## Findings

Area Type and Paramilitary Groups Help Keep Area Safe More respondents who lived in rural areas, disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups help keep their area safe, compared to those from urban areas. From 2018, the figures for those living in rural areas show a gentle downward trend, where as for those in urban areas, the figures rose between 2018 ( $72.6 \%$ ) and 2019 ( $74.9 \%$ ), before dropping to $62.0 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 56).
Figure 56: Paramilitaries keep area safe by area type


School Attended and Paramilitary Groups Help Keep Area Safe
More respondents who attended a grammar school, disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups help keep their area safe, compared to those who attended a secondary school. However, both categories show a similar trend, with figures rising steadily between 2017 and 2019, before decreasing in 2020 (Figure 57).
Figure 57: Paramilitaries keep area safe by area identity


Area Identity and Paramilitary Groups Help Keep Area Safe*
Across all three years, more respondents who described their area as neither Loyalist or Republican disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups help keep there area safe ( $81.9 \%, 86.3 \%, 82.2 \%$ ). This is compared to those who describe their area as mainly Loyalist ( $73.0 \%, 74.8 \%, 61.6 \%$ ) or mainly Republican ( $68.9 \%, 71.1 \%, 63.9 \%$ ). However, all three categories show a rise in figures between 2018 and 2019, before decreasing in 2020 (Table 11b; 11c; 11d).
*2017 figures for this question are not available due to low base

## 2 <br> Findings

Paramilitary Groups Create Fear and Intimidation
Respondents were asked if they felt paramilitary groups create fear and intimidation within their area. The proportion of respondents who reported that they strongly agreed or agreed with this statement increased from $13.8 \%$ in 2017 to $20.4 \%$ in 2019 , before decreasing again in $2020(14.1 \%)$. The percentage of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement shows an upward trend, rising from 2018 ( $56.1 \%$ ) to 2020 ( $60.1 \%$ ) (Figure 58).

Figure 58: Paramilitary groups create fear and intimidation in my area


## 2 <br> Findings

Religion and Paramilitary Fear and Intimidation In 2017, 2019 and 2020, a smaller proportion of respondents who identified as having no religion disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups create fear and intimidation within their area. Whereas, a greater proportion of respondents who identified as Catholic disagreed or strongly disagreed to this statement. While figures for those who identified as Catholic or as having no religion and disagreed or strongly disagreed show a general downward trend across, all four years, in 2020, for those who identified as Protestant, the percentage of respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing peaked (69.4\%) (Figure 59).
Figure 59: Paramilitaries create fear and intimidation by religion


## Gender and Paramilitary Fear and Intimidation

Across all four years, a higher proportion of males disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries create fear and intimidation within their area, compared to females. However, a similar trend can be seen in figures for both male and female respondents, dropping from 2017 to 2018 , before rising again in 2019. However, in 2020, the proportion of male respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing rose to $69.6 \%$, while the proportion of females decreased to $53.0 \%$ (Figure 60).
Figure 60: Paramilitaries create fear and intimidation by gender


School Attended and Paramilitary Fear and Intimidation Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who attended a grammar school ( $71.2 \%, 60.9 \%, 63.6 \%, 65.2 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries create fear and intimidation in their area, compared to those who attended a secondary school ( $65.5 \%, 50.0 \%, 56.3 \%, 53.9 \%$ ) (Table 12a, 12b, 12c, 12d).

## 2 <br> Findings

Living Arrangements and Paramilitary Fear and Intimidation Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents living with both parents ( $72.7 \%, 59.2 \%, 62.2 \%, 63.4 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitaries create fear and intimidation in their area, compared to those living with one parent ( $61.0 \%, 47.7 \%, 49.8 \%, 50.2 \%$ ). However a similar trend can be seen across both categories, after peaking in 2017, figures drop in 2018, before increasing slightly over the following two years(Figure 61).
Figure 61: Paramilitaries create fear and intimidation by living arrangements


## Area Type and Paramilitary Fear and Intimidation

Across all four years, more respondents who lived in rural areas, disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups create fear and intimidation in their area, compared to those living in urban areas. From 2017 to 2019 , the figures for those living in rural areas show a gentle downward trend $(76.5 \%$, $73.9 \%, 65.0 \%)$, before rising again in 2020 ( $71.3 \%$ ). Where as for those in urban areas, the figures rose between 2018 ( $46.5 \%$ ) and 2019 ( $55.5 \%$ ), before decreasing slightly to 53.6\% in 2020 (Figure 62).

Figure 62: Paramilitaries create fear and intimidation by area type


Area Identity and Paramilitary Fear and Intimidation*
Across all three years, more respondents who described their area as neither Loyalist or Republican ( $64.2 \%, 69.7 \%, 76.6 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups create fear and intimidation in their area. This is compared to those who describe their area as mainly Loyalist ( $48.1 \%, 46.5 \%, 52.5 \%$ ) or mainly Republican ( $57.9 \%, 59.4 \%, 53.3 \%$ ) (Table 12a, 12b, 12c, 12d).

## 2 <br> Findings

## Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime

Respondents were asked if they felt paramilitary groups contribute to crime, drug-dealing and anti-social behaviour within their area. The number of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed has steadily decreased from $64.5 \%$ in 2017 to $54.6 \%$ in 2018 , before rising again across the following two years to $57.6 \%$ in 2020 . Around one fifth of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed in $2017(17.0 \%), 2018(21.1 \%)$ and $2019(20.5 \%)$. However, in 2020 this figure rose to $25.4 \%$. Furthermore, the proportion of those who strongly agreed or agreed rose steadily since 2017 (18.5\%) to 2020 ( $24.4 \%$ ), before decreasing again in 2020 (17.0\%) (Figure 63).

Figure 63: Paramilitary groups contribute to crime, drug-dealing and anti-social behaviour within my area


## Findings

Gender and Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime A greater proportion of female respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime in 2017 and $2018(65.6 \%, 54.1 \%)$. However, from 2018 to 2020, a downward trend can be seen for female respondents, while an upward trend can be seen for male respondents. In 2019 and 2020, a higher proportion of male respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed ( $57.0 \%, 63.2 \%$ ) compared to females (Figure 64).
Figure 64: Paramilitaries contribute to crime in area by gender
( 100 Proportion of respondents who Disagree/Strongly Disagree

Area Type and Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who live in a rural area ( $73.2 \%, 69.6 \%, 64.0 \%, 70.1 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime, compared to those who live in an urban area $(58.6 \%$, $46.2 \%, 49.7 \%, 50.4 \%$ ). While the figures for those living in rural areas show a downward trend from 2017 to 2019, before a sharp increase in 2020, for respondents living in urban areas, a sharp decrease can be seen from 2017 to 2018. This is followed by a slow increase across the following three years (Figure 65).
Figure 65: Paramilitaries contribute to crime in area by area identity


Area Identity and Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime*
Across all three years, more respondents who described their area as neither Loyalist or Republican ( $60.3 \%, 66.1 \%, 70.7 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime. Furthermore, a smaller proportion of respondents who described their area as mainly Loyalist ( $46.9 \%, 43.9 \%, 48.2 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime when compared to those who described their area as mainly Republican ( $55.3 \%, 56.5 \%, 54.5 \%$ ) or neither Loyalist or Republican (Table 13b; 13c; 13d).
*2017 figures for this question are not available due to low base

## Findings

Religion and Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime Across all four years, a smaller percentage of respondents who identified as having no religion disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime compared to those who identified as either Catholic or Protestant. While a higher number of those who identified as Catholic disagreed or strongly disagreed across the first three years ( $70.4 \%$, $56.6 \%, 64.1 \%$ ), a bigger proportion of those who identified as Protestant disagreed or strongly disagreed in 2020 (66.9\%) (Figure 66).
Figure 66: Paramilitaries contribute to crime in area by religion


School Attended and Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime
Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who attended a grammar school disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime, compared to those who attended a secondary school. While both categories show a drop in figures from 2017 to 2018, there was a larger decrease for those respondents who attended secondary school (Figure 67).

Figure 67: Paramilitaries contribute to crime in area by school attended


## Living Arrangements and Paramilitary Groups Contribute to Crime

Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who live with both parents ( $66.5 \%, 57.4 \%, 57.7 \%, 60.5 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups contribute to crime, compared to those living with one parent $(59.8 \%, 45.1 \%, 45.8 \%$, $49.5 \%$ ). However both categories show a similar trend, after a sharp decrease between 2017 and 2018 , figures show a gradual upward trend across the following three years (Table 13a; 13b; 13c; 13d).

## 2 <br> Findings

### 2.10 Young People and Crime

## Young People Contribute to Crime

The next series of questions asked respondents for their opinions regarding young people in their area. The first asked whether young people contributed to crime and anti-social behaviour within their area. In 2018 and 2019, the number of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed remained consistent at approximately one third ( $32.7 \%, 32.6 \%$ ). However, in 2020, this decreased to $26.7 \%$. The percentage of respondents remained fairly consistent across all four years at just under one fifth of respondents (17.6\%, 17.2\%, $19.7 \%, 19.4 \%$ ) The number of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed decreased from 2017 (57.3\%) to 2019 (47.7\%). However, this rose again to 53.9\% in 2020 (Figure 68).

Figure 68: Young people contribute to crime and anti-social behaviour within their area


## Findings

## Gender and Young People Contribute to Crime

Across all four years, more male respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed there is a lot of crime among young people in their area, compared to females. Furthermore, figures for both males and females show a similar trend, decreasing from 2017 to 2019, before increasing again in 2020. However, 2020 shows a sharper rise for males compared to females (Figure 69).
Figure 69: Young people contribute to crime in area by gender

| Proportion of respondents who Disagree/Strongly Disagree |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 100 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $58.1$ | 51.2 | 50.7 | $60.3$ |
|  |  | 49.3 |  | 49.3 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | -Male | $\rightarrow$ |  |

Area Type and Young People Contribute to Crime
Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who live in a rural area $(70.6 \%, 69.1 \%, 59.8 \%, 70.1 \%)$ disagreed or strongly disagreed there is a lot of crime among young people in their area, compared to those who live in an urban area ( $49.3 \%, 40.9 \%, 40.3 \%, 44.8 \%$ ). While the figures for those living in rural areas show a downward trend from 2017 to 2019, before a sharp increase in 2020, for respondents living in urban areas, a more gradual decrease can be seen from 2017 to 2019. This is followed by a slight increase in 2020 (Table 14a; 14b; 14c; 14d).

## 2 Findings

Area Identity and Young People Contribute to Crime Across all four years, more respondents who described their area as neither Loyalist or Republican disagreed or strongly disagreed that that there is a lot of crime among young people in their area, compared to those who describe their area as mainly Republican or mainly Loyalist. Figures for respondents who described their area as mainly Republican or mainly Loyalist remained fairly consistent with each other across all years (Figure 71).

Figure 71: Young people contribute to crime in area by area identity


School Attended and Young People Contribute to Crime From 2018 to 2020, a higher proportion of respondents who attended a grammar school disagreed or strongly disagreed that that there is a lot of crime among young people in their area, compared to those who attended a secondary school. However, after a sharp decrease in figures in 2018 (37.7\%) for those who attended a secondary school, figures increased again to $51.1 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 72).
Figure 72: Young people contribute to crime in area by school attended


Living Arrangements and Young People Contribute to Crime
Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who live with both parents ( $61.6 \%, 53.8 \%, 50.3 \%, 59.2 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed there is a lot of crime among young people in their area,, compared to those living with one parent $(45.0 \%, 39.4 \%$, $40.0 \%, 38.5 \%$ ) (Table 14a; 14b; 14c; 14d).

## 2 <br> Findings

## Young People Influenced by Paramilitary Groups

Respondents were then asked if young people were being influenced too much by paramilitary groups within their area. In 2017, $10.5 \%$ of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. Across the following three years this figure rose to $17.6 \%$ in 2020. The proportion of respondents who stated that they neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement peaked at $23.0 \%$ in 2018, before decreasing again to $21.8 \%$ in 2019 and rising again to $22.8 \%$ in 2020 . The number of respondents who strongly disagreed or disagreed peaked at $72.3 \%$ in 2017. This decreased to $59.5 \%$ in 2020 (Figure 73).

Figure 73: Young people are being influenced too much by paramilitary groups within their area


## Findings

Gender, Young People and Paramilitary Influence In 2017, a higher proportion of female respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that young people are influenced by paramilitary groups. However, across the following three years figures showed a steady decline. For male respondents, figures stayed consistent with that of females in 2018 ( $64.8 \%, 64.7 \%$ ), and although figures rose slightly across the following years, the decline in the figures for female respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing means that the proportion of males that disagreed or strongly disagreed makes up the larger percentage (Figure 74).
Figure 74: Young people and paramilitary influence by gender


Religion, Young People and Paramilitary Influence In 2017, 2018 and 2019, a greater percentage of respondents who identified as Catholic disagreed or strongly disagreed that young people are influenced by paramilitary groups, compared to those who identified as Protestant or as having no religion. However in 2020, a higher proportion of respondents who identified as Protestants disagreed or strongly disagreed compared to those who identified as Catholic or as having no religion (Figure 75).
Figure 75: Young people and paramilitary influence by religion

Proportion of respondents who Disagree/Strongly Disagree


## School Attended, Young People and Paramilitary Influence

Across all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who attended a grammar school ( $75.1 \%, 70.7 \%, 71.6 \%, 64.6 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that that young people are influenced by paramilitary groups, compared to those who attended a secondary school $(67.4 \%, 54.8 \%, 59.7 \%, 54.7 \%)$. While figures for both categories show a general downward trend from 2017 to 2020 , the figures for respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing who attended a secondary school, show a sharp decrease in figures in 2018 (54.8\%) (Table 15a; 15b; 15c; 15d).

## Findings

## Living Arrangements, Young People and Paramilitary

 InfluenceAcross all four years, a higher proportion of respondents who live with both parents, disagreed or strongly disagreed young people are influenced by paramilitary groups, compared to those living with one parent. For both categories, a general downward trend can be seen across all four years, despite a small increase for those who live with one parent in 2019. (Figure 76).
Figure 76: Young people and paramilitary influence by area identity


Area Type, Young People and Paramilitary Influence Across all four years, more respondents who lived in rural areas, disagreed or strongly disagreed that paramilitary groups create fear and intimidation in their area, compared to those living in urban areas. After peaking in 2018 (84.3\%), the figures for respondents living in rural areas who disagreed or strongly disagreed decreased over the following two years. In contrast, after a sharp decrease in figures in 2018 (53.9\%), those living in urban areas who disagreed or strongly disagreed showed a rise in figures, before decreasing again in 2020 (Figure 77).

Figure 77: Young people and paramilitary influence by area type


## Area Identity, Young People and Paramilitary Influence*

Across all three years, a higher proportion of respondents who described their area as neither Loyalist or Republican (72.7\%, 74.3\%, $74.6 \%$ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed that young people are influenced by paramilitary groups. This is compared to figures for those who describe their area as mainly Loyalist ( $59.0 \%, 55.6 \%, 48.8 \%$ ) or mainly Republican ( $60.3 \%, 68.7 \%, 56.3 \%$ ) (Table 15b; $15 \mathrm{c} ; 15 \mathrm{~d})$.
*2017 figures for this question are not available due to low base

## Annex 1 - Technical Annex

## Sampling and fieldwork

The survey sample was taken from the Child Benefit Register. Child Benefit is a benefit for people bringing up children and is paid for each child. Therefore, the Child Benefit Register contains information on all children for whom Child Benefit is claimed. The sample for each of the surveys was provided by HMRC. The sample for the 2017, 2018 and 2019 surveys included all 16 -year olds with January, February and March birthdays. Exceptional circumstances in 2020 and 2021, as a result of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, meant that the survey fieldwork, originally planned for the last quarter of 2020 had to be postponed until May 2021. Therefore the sample for the 2020 survey included all 16-year olds with April, May or June birthdays.

| Year | Delivered Sample | Eligible Sample | Purple Survey Sample | Responses | Response Rate |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | 5437 | 5310 | 2719 | 572 | 21.6 |
| 2018 | 5152 | 4986 | 2577 | 492 | 20.0 |
| 2019 | 5092 | 4966 | N/A | 1131 | 23.0 |
| 2020 | 4999 | 4913 | N/A | 2069 | 42.1 |

Due to the high level of interest in the YLT survey in and the respective number of questions included, a split survey needed to be run. In 2017, the 5,310 individuals were randomly spilt between the 'Blue' $(2,660)$ and 'Purple' $(2,650)$ surveys. In 2018 the 4,986 individuals were randomly spilt between the 'Green' $(2,499)$ and 'Purple' $(2,487)$ surveys. Safety and Attitudes to Paramilitaries was included in the 'Purple' version of the survey both years.

In 2019 the survey was not split and therefore one survey was completed by 4,966 individuals. However, in 2020, the survey was split into version $A$ and version $B$. Although there are no breakdown figures given in the technical annex over how many individuals responded to each version, a total of 4,913 individuals responded to one of the surveys.

Following mailout of the survey, respondents could choose one of two methods for completing the questionnaire:

- They could complete the questionnaire online - inputting their personal identifier to enter that part of the YLT website.
- They could complete the paper questionnaire and post it back in the pre-stamped envelope.

In 2017 and 2020 a third method for completing the questionnaire was offered:

- They could take part by phone, having quoted their identification number and check letter.


## Annex 1 - Technical Annex

## Weighting

No weighting was applied to the dataset.

## Rounding, Error and Statistical Significance

Percentages may not always sum to 100 due to the effect of rounding or because respondents could give more than one response.

Due to a combination of both sampling and non-sampling error, any sample is unlikely to reflect precisely the characteristics of the population. The number of cases upon which analysis is based is important, as it influences the precision (standard error) of the estimates. The Department of Justice does not routinely publish estimates where the Unweighted Base is less than 100 cases.

Because NILTS estimates are subject to sampling error, differences between estimates from successive years of the survey or between population subgroups may occur by chance.

For the purposes of this bulletin, where differences have emerged as being statistically significant, these have been reported in the text and /or Excel Tables. Statistical significance is reported at the $5 \%(p<0.05)$ level of probability (two-tailed tests). This means that, for any observed result that is found to be statistically significant, one can be $95 \%$ confident that this has not happened by chance. Please note no statistical testing was completed in relation to 'other' comments.

